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Purpose: Despite the vast literature on privatization, the relationship between change of 
ownership and performance is not clear. The purpose of the paper is to understand why 
we find divergences between the empirical results of papers analyzed. 
Design: We apply a meta-analysis to a sample of 60 empirical studies that analyze the 
performance of privatized companies. We check whether different results on 
performance can be explained by the method of privatization and the level of 
development of the country of privatized companies. 
Findings: Our findings indicate that companies privatized by public offerings obtain a 
better performance than companies privatized using other methods, such as private sale 
or voucher privatization, and do not support the common-place assumption that 
privatization in developing countries does not improve financial performance. 
Originality/value: The study contributes to the literature on privatization because it adds 
new empirical evidence about the privatization programs and it first applies a meta-
analysis to a sample about privatization on state owned companies. We discuss 
theoretical and managerial implications and offer suggestions for future research on 
privatization. 
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1.- Introduction 
The privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has become a common process all 
over the world and was considered a major component of the New Public Management 
–NPM–(Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Durant and Legge, 2001; Durant and Legge Jr, 
2002; Hodge, 2006; Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000; Löffler and Bovaird, 2009; Peters, 1996; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Torres and Pina, 2002 among other authors). In the 
framework of this doctrine, privatizations are expected to correct inefficiencies 
associated with the public sector. Since the beginning of this process, in the eighties, 
there have been numerous studies about the privatization policies carried out in different 
countries, analyzing their advantages and disadvantages and their impact on the 
economy. Although most cross-sectional studies give a considerable advantage to 
private ownership, the cumulative evidence is not conclusive (Villalonga, 2000). On 
average, there is an improvement in firm performance after privatization, but the 
variance across empirical tests is substantial. Despite the efforts of previous research, 
the question remains open.  
There are several potentially important theoretical moderators of the privatization–
performance relationship. Given the prominence of privatization as a determinant of 
performance differences, the initial evidence suggesting that the empirical evidence is 
mixed, and theory suggesting that there are important moderators of this relationship, a 
meta-analysis designed to clarify extant evidence seems both timely and warranted. 
Therefore, we present a meta-analysis to shed light on how the change of ownership 
impacts on the performance of privatized companies. Meta-analysis quantitatively 
aggregates prior studies’ empirical findings to detect whether a relationship exists and 
to estimate the magnitude of the effect by taking into account study artifacts, such as 
sampling and measurement error (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). Meta- analysis also 
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allows investigation of moderators that help explain why results vary systematically 
among studies of the same relationships. Although Bel and Fageda (2009) apply meta-
analysis to study privatization in the local sphere, to our knowledge, this methodology 
has not so far been applied to the study of the privatization of SOEs. To carry out the 
meta-analysis, we select publications that analyze the pre- and post-performance of 
privatized companies. Firstly, we carry out the funnel asymmetry test proposed by 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2010) and, secondly, a meta-regression analysis (MRA) 
method has been run to determine the effect of the method of privatization and the level 
of development of the country on financial performance. 
The purpose of the paper is to understand why we find divergences between the 
empirical results of papers analyzed. For this, we study whether differences in the 
financial performance of privatized companies are explained by two potential 
moderators (a) the method of privatization and (b) the level of development of the 
country. Overall, our findings indicate that the method of privatization is a determinant 
of the performance of privatized companies and results contradict the common-place 
assumption that privatization in developing countries does not improve the financial 
performance.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section contains the background to the 
privatization processes. Section 3 presents a review of the literature on the relationship 
between privatization and performance. Section 4 details the method used in the study 
and describes the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 5 presents our 





Both nationalization and privatization are the outcome of historical processes. 
Government ownership, through nationalization, has been perceived by some authors as 
necessary to promote growth. This ownership is higher in countries with low levels of 
per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient 
governments, and poor protection of property rights (La Porta et al., 2001). Another 
reason for nationalization is resentment towards the foreigners who had owned many of 
the largest firms in developing countries. Politicians consider that the state should 
control strategic economic sectors, such as steel production and defence. However, the 
political economy view indicates that governments acquire control of enterprises to 
provide employment, subsidies, and other benefits to supporters, who return the favour 
in the form of votes1. There is extensive literature about the reasons given by 
governments, politicians and national and international institutions to justify 
privatization processes. Yarrow (1999) listed the following reasons: enhancing 
efficiency by means of the introduction of competition and by obtaining resources in 
financial markets; reducing the deficit and the public debt; decreasing trade union 
influence; transferring the decision-making process in the markets of goods and services 
from the public to the private sector; encouraging a popular capitalism; empowering 
employees by selling them company shares; and redistributing social wealth. 
Theoretical reasons for contrary findings across studies include the modifications in the 
corporate governance system during the privatization process. The OECD (2001) 
considers that the privatization of SOEs has been one of the most important channels for 
improving corporate governance, which is a key element for enhancing economic 
efficiency and investor confidence. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
                                                 
1 For more detail, see the works of La Porta et. al (2001) and Megginson and Netter (2001), among 
others. 
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incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in line with the 
interests of the company and of shareholders and should create trust in order to promote 
an efficient and transparent market economy. The change of the ownership structure has 
required modifications in the mechanisms of corporate governance of privatized 
companies. In these companies, governance depends on the effectiveness of relations 
between interest groups that control the strategic management and the performance of 
the company. Corporate governance has to do with the agency problem and its 
fundamental question is how to assure investors that they get a return on their financial 
investment. To boost the development of corporate governance and reach this objective, 
it is necessary the separation of owners and managers and the expansion of capital 
markets, derived from the increase of quoted firms. 
With globalization, institutional investors force companies to comply with the rules of 
transparency and corporate governance, as institutional investors acquire shares of 
companies to maintain shares in the long run (Megginson, 2005). Creating a satisfactory 
corporate governance system generally involves changing a nation’s corporate and 
securities laws, strengthening the listing and disclosure requirements for its stock 
exchanges, enhancing the independence and competence of the national judiciary and 
establishing a regulatory regime capable of balancing the competing claims of 
managers, outside shareholders, and creditors. The privatization process influences 
internal and external mechanisms of CG (Faraci, 2001). Internal governance 
mechanisms include ownership concentration, board composition, executive 
compensation, top management replacement, the monitoring of executive decisions and 
the protection of outside investors. External governance mechanisms refer to the 
effectiveness of a market for corporate control that may permit the purchase of the firm 
when it is underperforming. Other corporate governance mechanisms are the legal 
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system and codes of good governance. The country’s legal system must force managers 
to feel the discipline of the capital market (D’Souza et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2000)2. 
Markets affording greater shareholder protection are consistently larger and more 
efficient. Codes of good governance are a set of best practice recommendations about 
the structure of the boards of directors and act as a substitute for deficiencies in the 
protection of shareholders in the legal system (Cuervo, 2002). 
In the privatization context, all these mechanisms are very important and the 
government should prevent the newly-created shareholders from being expropriated by 
the managers of privatized companies (Bortolotti et al., 2003). Where the law affords 
weak protection to shareholders, governments are more reluctant to relinquish control of 
SOEs to avoid opportunist behavior on the part of privatized firms and privatization 
efficiency is lower. Dharwadkar et al. (2000) argue that weak governance and a limited 
protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems3. 
Therefore, post privatization performance improves when corporate structures are 
introduced into the companies. 
In developing countries, the relationship between privatization and corporate 
governance has been analyzed by Boubakri et al. (2004, 2005, 2008) , among others. 
These authors  find that the change of ownership induces modifications in the corporate 
governance of firms and improves performance. The biggest improvements in 
performance are associated with developed stock markets and where laws protect 
shareholder rights. Nestor and Mahboobi (2000) assert that better incentives systems 
and governance mechanisms produce higher efficiency in privatized companies. If 
                                                 
2 La Porta et al. (2000) note that the protection of shareholders’ legal rights varies significantly across 
countries. Shareholders in countries with an English common law tradition benefit from much stronger 
legal protection than those living in nations with French civil law systems.  
3 These problems have relationship with issues of managerial discretion and expropriation, which occurs 
when large owners assume control of the firm and deprive minority owners of the right to appropriate 
returns on their investments.  
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companies incorporate a corporate governance system similar to private companies, 
they improve their performance whether they are privatized or not. This is because the 
SOEs’ system of governance experiences more dysfunctions due to interference from 
politicians (Alexandre and Charreaux, 2004). However, Cragg and Dick (1999) assert 
that the privatization of companies does not lead to changes in their corporate 
governance because the governments transform SOEs into giant bureaucracies. 
 
Although the agency and public choice theories defend that privatization improves the 
performance of companies4, many studies do not agree with this assertion5. There is 
considerable debate about whether the efficiency and productivity of a SOE depends 
more on regulation and competition in the market or on ownership (Ramamurti, 1997; 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Vining and Boardman, 1992; Yarrow et al., 1986; 
Zohlnhöfer et al., 2008). According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997), competition is one of the main components of improvements in the 
performance of privatized companies. Liberalization, more than privatization, forces 
public companies to be more efficient. Empirical studies like Megginson et al. (1994) 
and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) assert that there are significant differences 
between the performance of companies that operate in competitive and non-competitive 
markets. In these studies, it can be observed that all companies improve their 
performance after being privatized; but, if the market is competitive, the benefit will be 
higher.  
                                                 
4 See Arocena and Oliveros (2012), Boardman et al. (2002), Bortolotti et al. (2002), Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), D'souza and Megginson (1999), Eckel et al. (1997), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), 
Megginson and Sutter (2006), Megginson et al. (1994), Prior and Surroca (2005), Qi et al. (2000), 
Rodríguez et al. (2007). 
5 See Arcas and Bachiller, 2008; Bacchiocchi et al., 2005; Boussofiane et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2007; 
Frydman et al., 1999; Martin and Parker, 1995; Omran, 2009; Parker and Hartley, 2006; Pejovich, 2005; 
Villalonga, 2000; Wu, 2006; Bachiller, 2009. 
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Figure 1 summarizes factors that boost the privatization process and its main results. 
Key elements such as globalization, liberalization, regulation, competition, restructuring 
of privatized companies and changes in corporate governance systems are causal factors 
that influence post privatization performance. Results of the privatization process may 
be observed in the economy (more competitive and developed markets and 
modernization of corporate governance, among others) and in the companies (higher 
efficiency and performance). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.- Theory and literature review  
Method of privatization 
The decision about which privatization method to employ is not straightforward. 
Political factors, like the ideology of the government in question of market and 
regulation, and economic factors, like the financial position of SOEs and the conditions 
of capital markets, are involved in the process. Governments chose privatization by 
public offer and established a regulation to increase the confidence of potential investors 
and guarantee that the capital markets were appropriate for investing in these companies 
(OECD, 1998). 
The adoption of privatization programs seeks to promote the so-called popular 
capitalism, that is, the democratization of capital markets through the participation of 
citizens in privatization processes. The purpose of this is to decrease ownership 
concentration, which can have a negative effect on firm performance (Wang and 
Shailer, 2015), to strengthen a nation’s governance systems and to lead to significant 
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improvements in financial systems and changes in the market regulation to create more 
competitive and efficient markets. Privatization programs have forced governments to 
improve effective governance systems so that the change of ownership of SOEs is 
perceived as both an economic and a political success (Megginson, 2005; Tian and 
Estrin, 2008). This is more complex than simply selling SOEs because it implies that 
many rules and institutions have to change simultaneously. Concern about the security 
issues of capital markets rose with the privatization process and the law has tried to 
strengthen the protection of minority shareholders (Corrado and Zollo, 2006).  
Privatizations through initial public offering (IPO) have fomented the development of 
capital markets (Megginson et al., 2004). The sale of shares of SOEs have tended to be 
underpriced to attract the participation of investors (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; 
Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008), who consider that 
privatized firms are ‘too big to fail’ and whose regulatory framework protects them. 
Larger and more profitable SOEs are more likely to be privatized through capital 
markets, while governments that have less state control over the economy tend to 
privatize SOEs via asset sales. Quoted companies generate an economic benefit from 
the increase in liquidity that they provoke in capital markets. Moreover, the public 
trading of shares establishes the possibility of takeover by outsiders and the threat of a 
takeover is another management control mechanism. These market operations may 
stimulate managers to achieve greater efficiency and to avoid being acquired by another 
company. A major consequence of privatization is that privatized companies can be 
targets of takeovers and mergers.  
From these explanations, it can be deduced that the level of development of capital 
markets is a key determinant of post-privatization efficiency gains (Boubakri and 
Cosset, 1998). More developed markets facilitate access to private debt and equity, 
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which allows a more far-reaching modernization and restructuring of companies. 
Companies whose shares are traded in more sophisticated and active markets can obtain 
greater performance improvements from the privatization process. 
Taking all the above into account, we posit that: 
H1: The method of privatization is a determinant of the performance of privatized 
companies. 
 
Developed and developing countries 
The determinants of privatization performance are different in developed and 
developing countries (Boubakri et al., 2005; D’Souza et al., 2005). The institutional 
framework is weaker in developing countries, which provides limited investor 
protection (Boubakri et al., 2008). When the law affords weak protection to 
shareholders, governments are more reluctant to sell SOEs to avoid opportunist 
behavior from privatized firms, potential investors do not trust privatization processes 
and their effectiveness, consequently, is lower.  
In developing economies, the costs by the limited competition due to technology 
(economies of scale, network externalities) are internalized by the governments of these 
countries and manifested during the privatization. Traditional agency problems may be 
pronounced because of underdeveloped institutional infrastructures, the lack of effective 
governance mechanisms, poor enforcement of property rights and underdeveloped 
capital markets without effective control (Zahra et al., 2000).  The evidence shows that 
privatization produces better performance in countries where stock market development 
and trade liberalization preceded privatization (Boubakri et al., 2005).  Dharwadkar et 
al. (2000) argue that principal-agent problems are linked to issues of managerial 
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discretion and expropriation, which occur when large owners assume control of the firm 
and deprive minority owners of the right to appropriate returns on their investments. 
In developing economies, privatization is a complex economic and political process 
(Frydman et al., 1999). Privatization programs are much larger than in developed 
countries and these processes are part of a wider reform of political and economic 
systems. Restructuring the company may lead to a successful privatization process 
(Boussofiane et al., 1997; Alexandre and Charreaux, 2004; Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 
2008; Chong and Galdo, 2007; Cragg and Dyck, 1999). However, the literature shows 
that the state has continued to hold shares in the vast majority of privatized companies 
(Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007) and management has not been replaced in these companies. 
The post-privatization ownership structure tends to be mainly concentrated in the hands 
of local institutional investors, which could hinder stock-market growth and the 
replacement of the management. So, the newly privatized enterprises have difficulty 
carrying out the restructuring with the existing management and, as Dyck (1997) 
asserts, face additional costs in purchasing managerial skills on the labor market 
because of the adverse selection problem.  
Consequently, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Performance of privatized companies differs in developed and developing 
countries. 
4.- Meta-analysis data 
4.1 Selection of studies 
To date, more than sixty papers have studied the relationship between privatization and 
performance. However, they contain conflicting empirical results that come from study 
characteristics that affect the privatization-performance relation. We only focus on the 
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financial performance because the non-financial performance (e.g. quality and 
effectiveness) has not been analyzed by a sufficient number of studies to warrant a 
robust meta-analysis. 
In order to identify relevant studies, our literature search responds to the combination of 
keywords “privatization and performance” and the search was completed in October, 
2014. Our meta-analysis includes articles published in academic journals in the fields of 
Economics, Administrative Science, Finance and Public Administration, non-published 
papers and working papers6. The databases used to discriminate the articles are the ISI 
Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar.  
We selected the empirical studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis on the basis of a set 
of criteria. First, we included only empirical studies that reported sample sizes and r- 
statistics of effects, such as correlation coefficients (Rosenthal, 1991). In the Meta-
analysis, the most widely used metric is the Pearson correlation coefficient r, which 
indicates the association between ownership and performance after controlling for other 
factors. The use of r as the effect size is appropriate, it is scale-free and indicates both 
the direction and magnitude of the relations (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Second, the 
paper had to contain at least one relationship between privatization and performance. 
The selection yielded a total of 60 studies, dated 1989-2014, with quantitative and 
comparable data on financial performance and privatization. The sample covers 48 
countries and data years 1961-2010. 
Table 1 shows general information on all the studies included in our sample. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2 Publication status 
                                                 
6 Almost all the authors analysed have published their studies in journals; only a few of the articles are 
unpublished. 
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As far as we know, our sample includes all studies that analyze the performance of 
privatized companies and explain their determinants factors. Given that meta-analysis 
requires as many papers as possible, we have included non-published papers and 
working papers with comparable and homogeneous statistics. 
 4.3 Publication bias 
Publication bias or file-drawer problem arises when researchers, referees or editors have 
a preference for publishing results that either support a particular theory or are 
statistically significant. This is particularly strong in fields that show little disagreement 
concerning the correct sign of the parameter. As a consequence, estimates supporting 
the theory are more likely to be published, whereas insignificant results or results 
showing an effect inconsistent with the theory tend to be underrepresented in the 
literature (Valickova et al., 2014). 
Following Stanley and Doucouliagos (2010), we regress the estimated effect size on its 
standard error. Table 2 reports the results of the funnel asymmetry test for each different 
performance measure. For measures of financial performance, profitability, efficiency, 
investment, leverage, output and dividends, the constant is non-significant, which 
indicates no publication bias. For employment and management, the constant exhibits 
publication bias. These findings suggest that conclusions based on a review of published 
data could be incorrect. The coefficient 1/SE measures the privatization–performance 
effect, corrected for publication selection. The statistically significant estimation of this 
coefficient for profitability, efficiency, investment, output and dividends indicates that 
the literature identifies, in most cases, a positive link between privatization and these 
measures of performance. This relationship is clearer for efficiency and profitability, 
whose p-value denotes significance at the 1% level. For leverage, this coefficient is not 
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significant, which indicates a lack of relationship between this magnitude and 
privatization. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.- Methodology 
5.1 Estimating effect size 
We calculate the effect size as the correlation coefficient r. For studies that do not report 
r statistics, that is, studies that report Z statistics from the Wilcoxon test and Student’s t-
test, we compute r as follows (Rosenthal, 1991): 
 
where n is the sample size.  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of correlation coefficients for the relationship 
between privatization and performance. For each study, we select the coefficients of 
different measures of financial performance: profitability, employment, efficiency, 
investment, leverage, output, management and dividends. We follow the criteria of 
papers considered into the meta-analysis about the relationship between these measures 
and the performance. Papers included in the meta-analysis use ROA, ROE and ROS as 
profitability measures. Therefore, the relationship between profitability and 
performance is considered positive. The efficiency is measured as the ratio sales/profit 
over employees and as a efficiency index provided by the DEA model. The relationship 
between efficiency and performance is positive. The number of employees is used as 
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measure of employment. Its relationship with performance is considered positive. Papers 
use the ratios investment over sales and over employees as Investment measures. A 
positive relationship between investment and performance is indicative of improved 
performance. The leverage is mainly measured as the ratio debt over assets; therefore, 
the relationship with performance is considered negative. The variable real sales 
(output) has a positive relationship with the performance. Papers have defined 
differently the variable management (i.e. process innovation, organizational innovation, 
strategic renewal). For all papers, this variable has a positive relationship with 
performance. Papers included in the meta-analysis use dividends payout and the ratio 
dividends over sales as dividend measures. Therefore, the relationship between this 
measure and performance is considered positive. In sum, a positive (negative) sign for 
profitability, employment, efficiency, investment, output, management and dividends 
(leverage) is considered an improved (non-improved) performance.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
We carry out the Hunter and Schmidt (1990) meta-analysis to obtain comparable effects 
and convert them to a common metric. This methodology uses statistical aggregation 
techniques for cumulating correlations and correcting for various study artefacts in 
order to estimate the true score correlation (ρ) between privatization and performance. 
When one study offered various correlations between a performance measure and 
privatization (correlations, for example, due to various measures of independent 
variables), we use one correlation coefficient per study (the mean correlation 
coefficient) in the meta-analysis in order to maintain independence between 
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observations (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). For each association between the 
performance variable and privatization, we first calculate the weighted mean correlation 
coefficient (ṝ=ΣNi ri / ΣNi), the total observed variance (S
2
r= ΣNi (ri- )
2/ ΣNi) and the 
sampling error variance (Se
2 = (ri- 
2)2 k/ ΣNi), where Ni is the number of observations 
in each sample, r the effect size for sample i and k the number of effect sizes. Larger 
sample sizes are given more weight in order to reduce sampling error, which declines as 
sample size increases. 
To evaluate whether the empirical correlations are homogeneous, we use two tests: (1) 
the 75% rule, according to which, if 75% of the observed variance across studies can be 
explained by sampling errors [(100) Se
2 / Sr
2 ≥ 75], we can conclude that there is no true 
variance in the studies and, thus, the association is un-moderated and homogeneous; and 
(2) the Q statistic: 
Q = k (Sr
2)/(Se
2) = N Se
2 / (1 − 2)2 
where k is the number of effect sizes included in the analysis, Sr
2 the total observed 
variance, Se
2 the sampling error variance, N the total sample size of the effect sizes and 
 the mean correlation coefficient. The statistical function of Q has a chi-square 
distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom, and a significant Q would indicate rejection of 
the null hypothesis of homogeneity. 
5.2 The meta regression model 
We carry out a meta-regression, taking the relation between privatization and 
performance as the dependent variable and the method of privatization, the industry and 
the kind of country analyzed as independent variables. For the meta-analysis, we use the 
Fisher's Z transformation of correlation coefficient between privatization and 
performance obtained from the studies as the dependent variable in the meta-regression. 
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These values are indicative of different measures of financial performance above 
mentioned: profitability, employment, efficiency, investment, leverage, output, 
management and dividends. In particular, we estimate the following relationship: 
Financial Performance = f (Method privatization, Developing, Industry, D70, D80, D90, 
Percentage)  (1) 
where 
- Method of privatization is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the study refers 
to companies privatized by IPO and 0 otherwise.  
- Developing is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the study analyzes companies 
privatized in developing countries and 0, in developed countries.  
- Industry is a control variable that takes value 1 when the study analyzes companies 
from several industries and 0 otherwise.  
- Percentage of privatization: dummy variable to control for any impact on performance 
due to the percentage of privatized shares (full –value 1- or partial privatization).  
- Decade of privatization: dummies variables that control for the decades in which the 
privatization operations have been carried out. The variables D70, D80 and D90 are 
introduced into the regression to indicate whether the company was privatized in the 
seventies, eighties or nineties, respectively; the value is equal to one in the affirmative 
case and zero otherwise. The base is D60. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables. 
6.- Analysis of results 
We analyze the association between privatization and performance separately in Tables 
5, 6 and 7.  
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In Table 5, we offer the results of the meta-regression analysis for each different 
performance measure whose dependent variable is the Fisher's Z transformation of 
correlation coefficient and the independent variables are method of privatization (public 
offer or others) and developing (kind of country, developing or developed)7. The 
variables introduced into the model as control variables are Industry, Decade of 
privatization (70-90) and Percentage. The F value is high enough to conclude that the 
variables with a significant t have a meaningful influence on the Zr. 
The results show a positive and significant coefficient for method of privatization in the 
profitability and efficiency models, which means that this variable is correlated with 
performance. Therefore, the method of privatization is an explanatory factor of post-
privatization performance and companies privatized via IPO obtain a better profitability 
and efficiency than those privatized via other methods. However, results indicate that 
companies privatized via IPO invest less than companies privatized by private sale.  
The variable developing is also significant for profitability, efficiency, investment and 
output. The privatization process carried out in developing and developed countries 
differs. Results indicate that profitability, efficiency, investment and output increase in 
developing countries. That is, companies privatized in developing countries obtain a 
better performance than those privatized in developed countries.  
The results show a non-significant coefficient for D70 and Y90, which means that these 
variables are not correlated with performance. The variable industry is only significant 
in the output dimension, which indicates that privatizations in only one industry lead to 
an improvement in output.  
                                                 
7 The regression has not been carried out for the variables management and dividends due the lack of 
degrees of freedom. 
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The coefficient of the variable Y80 indicates that privatizations carried out in the 
eighties are explanatory factors of post-privatization performance. The coefficient of the 
variable percentage indicates that full privatization leads to better profitability, less 
investment and less output. Therefore, this coefficient does not allow us to conclude that 
full privatization generates a better performance. 
We also carry out the Levene test to calculate the variances in ANOVA (Table 6). 
Levene's test has been used to assess the homogeneity of variances for each financial 
measure calculated for two groups and does not require normality. It tests the null 
hypothesis that the groups’ variances are equal, that is, there is homogeneity of variance 
or homoscedasticity. If the resulting p-value of Levene's test is less than the specify 
significance level, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is 
significant differences between groups, and so the ANOVA test conducted does no 
satisfy the homogeneity of variances assumption. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
As we can see, the results of the ANOVA indicate that the profitability, efficiency and 
investment of companies privatized through IPO has been different to the performance 
of companies privatized using other methods. So, the method of privatization influences 
performance. Differences are also significant for the variable developing; studies that 
analyze developed countries obtain different results to studies that analyze developing 
countries for profitability and investment.  
Table 7 shows the results of the overall meta-analysis for the association between all 
measures of performance and privatization.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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As we can see, global performance is positively and significantly associated with 
privatization. We cannot assume homogeneity since homogeneity tests are rejected. We 
also divide the sample into the different measures of performance. The relationships 
between privatization and profitability, efficiency, investment, output and dividends are 
positive and significant. This means that privatization has improved these financial 
measures. These results confirm the postulate of privatization theory which suggests 
that a change of ownership from public to private leads to improvements in 
performance. On the other hand, the association between performance and leverage is 
negative and significant. This indicates that privatization is inversely related to leverage.  
7.- Discussion 
In spite of the multitude of studies about the relationship between change of ownership 
and financial performance, the lack of consensus in the results leaves this debate open. 
This is why this study is motivated by three questions: whether, how and under which 
circumstances privatization benefit the performance of the firms. The conflicting 
evidence on this topic limits research development in this field and the use of one type 
of measure rather than another limits the study of performance. The high variance in 
previous empirical findings point to the existence of contextual moderators. Following 
an evidence-based research approach, we empirically synthesized research results of 60 
empirical studies about the relationship of privatization and performance by carrying 
out a meta-analysis. This methodology allows us to obtain a quantitative generalization, 
identify the factors that influence the relationship between privatization and 
performance and to understand why we find divergences between the empirical results 
of papers analyzed. 
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7.1.- Theoretical implications   
Theoretical debates regarding effects of privatizations center on how these programs 
influence performance. A prominent stream of literature proposes that private 
ownership have advantages in comparison to public ownership when operating in 
environments of competitive market structure (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Further 
research points to two important effects that could explain a positive performance 
impact of privatizations on firms: the method of privatization and the development of 
the institutional infrastructure and governance mechanisms (Zahra et al., 2000).  
The meta-regression shows that privatization through IPO seems to play an important 
role for performance effects of privatizations. Specifically, the relationship between 
privatization and profitability and efficiency is significantly stronger if the method is 
IPO. This result is coincident with D'Souza et al. (2001), Von Eije and Megginson 
(2008) and Arcas and Bachiller (2010), among others. Privatizations through IPO play 
an active role in corporate governance and governments structure IPO to maximize 
political and economic benefits at the expense of revenue maximization (Jones et al., 
1999) and care whether their citizens have a positive investment experience after 
purchasing shares os SOEs being privatized. In sum, they take care in designing IPOs 
and are concerned that the stock markets are fair and honest markets (Megginson, 
2005). To this, governments have adopted new regimes of corporate and securities law, 
establishing regulatory bodies to oversee privatized utilities and protect investors. The 
discipline of capital markets explains why IPOs are a more effective method of 
privatization than private sale and vouchers for improving firm performance. The threat 
of a takeover -when the company is not efficient enough- and the risk of bankruptcy are 
higher for quoted companies than for non-quoted companies. Furthermore, public 
equity markets increase managerial effort and accountability due to the information 
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requirements of market regulators. However, this results should be interpreted with 
caution as governments might be more proficient in selecting the more promising firms 
as target of privatizations.  
If we isolate the effect that privatizations have on investment the advantages from IPO 
vanishes. This finding indicates that proposed benefits associated with privatizations 
might be partially offset by disadvantages in the field of investments. For example, in 
the telecommunications sector the investment is necessary for technological progress 
and an increase in the services and quality delivered by these companies. Investment in 
infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, increasing competitiveness and 
improving service quality. Companies that invert retain market share and be more 
profitable in the long run, especially in markets characterized by networks. Furthermore, 
the investment in technology leads to an increase in service quality (Thatcher and 
Pingry, 2004). The institutional environment also influences the development of 
investment. If incentive regulation is appropriate, the service quality improves because 
companies invest more to keep their market position and the network expands. When 
competition is higher, privatized companies, motivated by a strong desire to retain 
market share in a competitive industry, choose to invest more in providing end-users 
with high service quality and use new techniques to differentiate themselves (Banerjee, 
2003). Regulators must eliminate restrictions on entry to encourage the creation of 
modern networks (Woroch, 2000) and promote competition, investment and innovation. 
Taken together, our results raise doubts whether there is – on average – a positive effect 
of privatization through IPO. 
Although privatization is a complex process in developing countries (Frydman et al., 
1993) because of underdeveloped institutional infrastructures, the lack of effective 
governance mechanisms and poor enforcement of property rights (Dharwadkar et al., 
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2000; Zahra et al., 2000), our results show the better performance of privatized 
companies in developing than in developed countries. Differences between government 
controls and regulation in developing and developed countries can explain why 
privatization acts differently in the two kinds of countries8. SOEs in developing 
countries do not have sufficient resources because of the weak state institutions which 
underfund infrastructure. These companies are more exposed to the corruption of their 
governments; therefore, the transfer of ownership to private hands may bring greater 
benefits in developing countries. Megginson (2005) assert that, in communist countries, 
deep reforms in corporate governance and the protection of creditors and investors led 
to superior economic performance, indicating the developing countries able to 
implement needed legal and regulatory changes were also able to recover most rapidly 
from the decline in output that all transition economies experienced after the collapse of 
communism. Moreover, the differences of rates of economic growth between 
developing and developed countries also explain why privatization in developing 
countries is a useful tool to improve firm performance. This result is consistent with 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and Megginson and Sutter (2006) who note strong 
performance improvements for companies operating in developing countries. The 
empirical evidence in developing economies shows that private ownership is better than 
diffuse ownership and foreign ownership is better than domestic. The identity of new 
owners is more important and the impact of post-privatization ownership on the 
performance is much greater than in non-developing economies (Megginson, 2005). 
When the control of SOEs is transferred to private holders, investment funds and 
foreign investors, most value is created due to managers are more effectively 
oversighted and disciplined by improved corporate governance regimes. The 
                                                 
8 We must be cautious since, in developing countries, where the regulation of infrastructure industries 
may be absent, the performance measures do not always show whether a reduction in availability or 
quality has occurred after privatisation. 
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appointment of new managers is associated with significant improvements in profit 
margin and labor productivity, particularly if the managers are selected by private 
owners (Claessens and Djankov, 1999). 
 It must be highlighted that privatization programs have been accompanied by 
liberalization processes in these countries which are much larger and have not always 
happened in developed countries. This indicates that governments have modernized a 
nation’s corporate governance system to promote transparent markets by introducing 
incentives systems in companies and creating arrangements that are conducive to 
effective governance. In line with the property rights theory, our findings suggest that 
privatization have replaced political managers in order to create an independent 
governance system in the companies in these countries. Investors acquire shares will 
restructure the company in order to adapt it to the new competitive environment and to 
recover their investment and obtain a higher profitability. 
7.2.- Managerial implications 
Findings presented in our study indicate that privatization thought IPO has a positive 
effect on the performance. Much of the positive performance effects are due to 
improvements in the corporate governance system and the discipline of capital markets, 
which can be value-creating especially with regard to firm growth. As D'Souza et al. 
(2001) assert, the public trading of shares of privatized companies in capital markets 
increases their efficiency if privatization is linked to the possibility of a takeover by 
outsiders, disciplines managers and allows linking compensation to performance. So, 
when shares are traded in public equity markets, managerial effort and accountability 
increase. The change of ownership means that managers have to justify their actions to 
new, private shareholders and are exposed to the risk of being replaced by more 
efficient managers. Moreover, disclosure requirements related to the IPO improves the 
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performance of privatized firms. In quoted companies, the uncertainty is reduced due to 
more information becomes available and information asymmetries decrease 
(Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Our findings provide further support to the theory that 
privatizations provide value for public firms. If access to substantial financial capital is 
available through other means rather than the public markets, the value that 
privatizations can provide likely diminishes. However, we also found that companies 
privatized in capital markets do not invest more than when they are SOEs. This suggest 
that the quality of delivered services may be deteriorated after privatization. Although 
privatization has reduced the role of the State in the production of good and services, the 
growing demand for more and better quality infrastructure services and technological 
developments in sectors as the telecommunications makes necessary to establish 
regulations to improve quality. Hence, economic regulators should choose standards 
according to consumers’ valuation  when they establish standards of quality regulation. 
Organizational change is another relevant effect of the privatization process. New 
management systems incorporate efficiency and customer orientation as objectives of 
the firms (Clarke and Pitelis, 1993). However, this can be done without the necessity of 
changing ownership. This is known as corporatization, that is, the company restructures 
itself and changes its governance to imitate private firms’ management and to be more 
efficient. The company incorporates incentive contracts, remuneration systems and 
changes in the corporate governance to guarantee transparency, which has a positive 
impact on the performance of public companies.  
7.3.- Limitations and Future Research 
The presence of heterogeneity in the meta-analysis indicates that other moderators 
determine the performance of privatized companies, including the regulatory 
framework. However, most studies included in the meta-analysis aggregate companies 
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from different countries and do not distinguish between regulated and non-regulated 
companies. 
The likelihood that a particular relationship is found to be significant is quite sensitive 
to the characteristics of study. Thus, researchers should be cautious in generalizing from 
the results of any specific analysis. In this paper, we check meta-analysis to control for 
the conditional factors and to draw general conclusions about privatization. However, 
our findings should be viewed within the context of the limitations endemic to the meta-
analysis methodology. As in most meta-analyses (see García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta, 2010), the problem of reverse causality -privatization affecting performance or 
performance affecting privatization- is not controlled for. Since the competition 
determine the expected performance improvements from privatization, further research 
on the roles of state Governments in competition and regulation should be considered.  
Despite a large empirical literature about economic and political impact of the 
privatization, the research has not yet answered how the change of ownership impacts 
privatized firm’s workers. The analysis of productivity of privatized firms let us know if 
employments levels remain stable or rise. However, it is difficult to predict whether a 
privatization process create or destroy jobs for an entire economy. Privatization 
generally causes the firm to reduce its direct employment levels, but the indirect effect 
of increased industrial dynamism may cause aggregate employment to increase. More 
research is needed to improve our understanding of this. Little research has analyzed 
privatization’s impact on the level of development of a country. Privatization eases 
national budget constraints; however, the overall distributional impact on different 
groups of citizens cannot be measured. Other possible research avenues include the 
analysis of the privatization of recent nationalized financial entities, especially, 
European commercial banks. In the nineties, 250 commercial banks were fully or 
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partially privatized by governments of 59 countries (Megginson, 2005), either IPOs or 
privately through an asset sale, because the state ownership was not working as planned. 
It is expected that governments decide to privatize these entities after having been 
rationalized to develop the financial system which promoted the economic growth and 
to recover the current financial aids given by Europe (Pina et al., 2016). 
Empirical evidence suggests that the industry seems to play an important role for 
performance effects of privatizations. It is supposed that the relationship between 
privatization and firm performance is significantly stronger in competitive industries 
and the competition in the market can bring efficiency gains. Studies that cover the 
privatizations by industry can be useful to expand the research. 
Overall, our findings suggest the need for a more contextual understanding of the firm 
performance phenomenon and the post-privatization benefits. The variance of the effect 
sizes further cautions researchers to be sensitive to consider a comprehensive set of 
positive and negative outcomes of privatizations.  
 
8.- Conclusions 
We conduct a meta-analysis to aggregate empirical evidence on the performance of 
privatized companies. The findings of the meta-regression show that the method of 
privatization is a determinant of the performance of privatized companies. Our results 
emphasize that companies privatized through public offering obtain a better 
performance than companies privatized using other methods, such as private sale or 
voucher privatization. In public offerings, legal and information requirements discipline 
quoted companies and obtain a bigger performance improvement. Our results do not 
support the common-place assumption that privatization in developing countries does 
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not lead to improvements in financial performance. The effective liberalization 
processes in these countries that were linked to the change of ownership may explain 
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